EUROPEAN EXPORT PERFORMANCE NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Until the collapse of international trade in goods during the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, trade in merchandise was driven by the exports and imports of emerging countries during more than a decade. These countries gained market shares in the manufactured goods market from industrialised countries. To study the way in which the European Union coped with this reinforced competition, we present an analysis of EU export performance against that of other main world exporters from 1994 to 2007.
This analysis is performed at a highly disaggregated product level. The recent theoretical and empirical literature in international trade which aimed at a renewed understanding of specialisation and competition, in particular between the North and the South, has shown that countries specialise indeed not in products or sectors, but in varieties of the same product (sold at different prices). Harmonised unit values from the BACI database of CEPII permit us to differentiate three price ranges for bilateral trade flows in some 5,000 products (in the 6-digit Harmonised System).
At this level of detail, the growth of world exports comes mainly from the increase in the value of existing flows (intensive margin) rather than the emergence of new trade flows (extensive margin). This is the case not only for large developed exporters, but also for China. In order to distinguish the exports performance of each country from the positions it acquired on different markets, we decompose the intensive margin of trade into three terms: a geographic structure effect, a sectoral structure effect, and a performance effect.
We find that from 1994 to 2007 the EU25 withstood the competition of emerging countries better than the U.S. and Japan. The loss of world market shares by EU25 in all products together is explained mostly by poor performance effects, especially of old member states and during the 1994-2000 period. From 2000 to 2007 EU25 manages to gain market shares acquired on the upper market segment of the market, where the EU cumulates good performance and favourable structure effects, while the U.S. and Japan withdraw extensively from this segment of the market. Finally, all developed countries lose market shares in high-technology products to developing countries, with the EU losing less than other countries. of old member states. More precisely, the EU gains market shares in the upper segment of the market, by cumulating good performance and favourable structure effects, contrary to the U.S. and Japan which withdraw extensively from this segment of the market. Finally, all developed countries lose market shares in high-technology products to developing countries, with the EU losing less than other countries.
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PERFORMANCES À L'EXPORTATION DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE RÉSUME NON TECHNIQUE
Jusqu'à l'écroulement du commerce international durant le dernier trimestre 2008 et le premier trimestre 2009, les échanges internationaux de biens ont été entraînés pendant plus d'une décennie par les exportations et importations des pays émergents. Ces pays ont gagné des parts sur les marchés de produits manufacturés, au détriment des pays industrialisés. Pour étudier la manière dont l'UE a fait face à cette concurrence renforcée, nous proposons ici une analyse de ses performances à l'exportation comparativement à celles des autres grands exportateurs mondiaux de 1994 à 2007.
Cette analyse est menée à un niveau fin de détail par produits. La littérature théorique et empirique récente en commerce international, qui a débouché sur une compréhension rénovée des spécialisations et de la concurrence, notamment entre Nord et Sud, a montré, en effet, que la spécialisation ne se fait plus au niveau des produits ou, a fortiori, des secteurs, mais au niveau des variétés d'un même produit (vendues à des prix différents). Les valeurs unitaires harmonisées de la base de données BACI du CEPII nous permettent de distinguer trois gammes de prix pour les flux bilatéraux d'échanges de quelque 5 000 produits (Système Harmonisé à six chiffres).
A ce niveau de détail, c'est l'accroissement en valeur des flux existants (marge intensive) et non pas l'apparition de nouveaux flux (marge extensive) qui explique l'essentiel de la croissance des exportations mondiales. C'est le cas non seulement pour les grands exportateurs développés mais aussi pour la Chine. Pour distinguer ce qui relève de la performance de chaque exportateur des positions qu'il a acquises sur les différents marchés, nous décomposons cette marge intensive en trois termes : un effet de structure géographique, un effet de structure sectoriel et un effet de performance.
Nous observons que, de 1994 à 2007, l'Union à 25 résiste mieux que les Etats-Unis et le Japon à la concurrence des émergents. La perte de parts de marché mondiales de l'UE-25, tous produits confondus, s'explique principalement par les effets de performance, notamment de la part des anciens pays membres et sur la période 1994 -2000 . De 2000 à 2007 , l'UE-25 parvient à gagner des parts de marché, acquises sur le haut de gamme où l'UE cumule bonnes performances et effets structurels favorables, alors que les Etats-Unis et le Japon reculent largement sur ce segment de prix. Enfin, sur les produits de hautetechnologie les pays développés perdent tous des parts de marché au profit des pays en développement, mais l'Europe parvient à en perdre moins que les autres.
RÉSUMÉ COURT
La spécialisation des pays ne se fait plus au niveau des produits ou des secteurs, mais au niveau des variétés d'un même produit (vendues à des prix différents). Pour étudier la manière dont l'UE fait face à l'émergence de nouveaux grands exportateurs mondiaux dans ce contexte renouvelé, nous analysons la redistribution mondiale des parts de marché au niveau des variétés en repérant pour chaque produit trois gammes de prix. Nous distinguons dans la croissance des exportations l'impact des effets structurels (géographique et sectoriel) et celui d'un pur effet de performance. De 1994 à 2007, l'Union à 25 résiste mieux que les Etats-Unis et le Japon à la concurrence des émergents. La perte de parts de marché de l'Union est concentrée sur la période 1994-2000 et s'explique par de mauvaises performances à l'exportation notamment de la part des anciens pays membres. Plus précisément, c'est sur le haut de gamme que l'UE gagne des parts de marché mondiales, cumulant bonnes performances et effets structurels favorables, contrairement aux Etats-Unis et au Japon qui en perdent largement sur ce segment de prix. Enfin, sur les produits de haute-technologie, les pays développés perdent tous des parts de marché au profit des pays en développement, mais l'Europe parvient à en perdre moins que les autres.
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INTRODUCTION
Emerging countries have been winning large market shares since the early 1990s. Among these, China stands out with the most remarkable performance: it almost tripled its world market share since 1994 reaching 16.1%. This evolution is striking for the most technological products, where some of the new competitors -if not all -have combined an increase in market share with a higher unit value of the exported products. Such outcome is at odds with the textbook illustration of the classical theory of international trade, whereby advanced economies should specialise in the technological or skilled intensive sectors, and the new competitors in lowtech or unskilled labour intensive sectors. How can older industrialised countries, and EU in particular, face up to this competition?
One first argument to consider is the diversification of the portfolio of products exported by emerging economies. Krugman (1989) argued that the propensity of fast growing emerging economies to diversify their bundle of exported products allowed them to increase their volume of exports without resorting to a real exchange rate depreciation. 2 Hummels & Klenow (2005) use a cross-section of detailed trade data to identify the patterns of exports of 110 countries in 1995, and ask whether large exporters ship more goods to more markets, or ship more of each good to each market. The answer is: two-thirds of more goods, one third of more of each good.
On the other hand, trade flows with persistently dissimilar prices can be observed within the most narrowly defined products. Advanced and emerging economies export rather similar bundles of goods (Schott (2004) and Schott (2008) ). Specialisation occurs inside these categories, on vertically differentiated varieties of products (Fontagné et al., 2008) . Baldwin & Harrigan (2007) introduce a theoretical framework in which competitiveness depends upon the qualityadjusted price. Accordingly, thresholds to enter a foreign market are defined in terms of qualityadjusted prices instead of prices alone. Baldwin & Ito (2008) classify products according to the related market structures (price competition versus quality competition) for a limited sample of world trade flows (nine big exporters). Estimating the price-distance relationship separately for each product, using panel data (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , they observe more "quality-competition goods" in EU exports than in U.S. and Japanese exports, and a very low share of "quality-competition goods" in Chinese exports. However, there is even some evidence of quality sorting among Chinese firms (Manova & Zhang, 2009 ) and thus quality might not necessarily be a good shield in the market-shares tournament.
Against this background, this paper aims to identify recent changes in specialisation and market shares of the EU in the context of the rapid emergence of China and other major emerging competitors. The changes observed for the United States, Japan, and big emerging competitors will provide a useful benchmark. The three issues addressed here are (i) what are the contributions of composition effects versus competitiveness to the observed changes in world market shares (ii) how entries of new competitors are reflected in the margins of world exports at the most detailed level of the product classification, and iii) how specialisation on products of different quality has shaped the recent evolution of world market shares.
To do so, it is necessary to rely on very detailed and longitudinal trade data, on an exhaustive basis, including information on unit values. To this end, we use a recently developed database of international trade at the product level, BACI, providing (FOB) reconciled values, as well as unit values (values/quantities), of all international trade flows, at the product level: 5,000 headings from the 6-digit Harmonised System (HS) classification, hereafter HS6.
Our value added is threefold. Firstly, we examine the change in market shares of leading world exporters over the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Importantly, the world distribution of unit values for each HS6 heading allows us to classify each product-bilateral flow into three price segments, and examine competition within each of these segments (section 2).
Secondly, relying on information by product, market, exporter, and year, we compute the "extensive margin" of trade, which is defined either as the change in the number of trade flows at the most detailed level, or as the net value of appearing and disappearing trade flows. The "intensive margin' of trade is symmetrically defined as the change in the value of trade flows that are present continuously throughout a given period (section 3). While a rapid turnover of trade flows can be observed -in a world matrix mostly "filled" of zeros -the largest contribution to the growth in the world trade value has been the intensive margin.
Thirdly, an econometric shift-share decomposition of export growth identifies for each exporter the contributions to the intensive margin of trade: export composition (by product and destination) versus competitiveness. Accordingly, export growth for each country is broken down into three components: a geographic composition effect, a sectoral composition effect and a performance effect (section 4). Countries have limited influence on the composition effects, which result from the growth of their markets, given the original geographical and sectoral orientation of their exports. In contrast, the performance effect captures the degree to which the exporting country has been able to gain (or lose) market shares: this is a true competitiveness effect. Ultimately, this decomposition is performed separately for the three market segments of the world distribution of unit values: low, medium, and high.
In a context of sharp reshaping of world trade flows since the mid-1990s, we conclude that the redistribution of market shares observed between emerging and developed countries -and among developing countries themselves -has differently affected the EU, Japan, and the U.S. The overall EU's good performance, compared to the United States or Japan, is associated with an original price-quality positioning of its products.
The rest of the paper, covering the period 1994-2007, is organised as follows. We review the redistribution of world market shares in Section 2, with a focus on high-tech and top range products. The impact of the emergence on trade margins is documented in Section 3. An econometric shift share analysis of export growth is documented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
THE REDISTRIBUTION OF WORLD MARKET SHARES BETWEEN 1994 AND 2007
The objective of this section is to take stock of the recent changes in EU world market shares, taking into account the price segment and technological content of exported products at the most detailed available level of the product classification. The EU is compared to other large exporters: the United States and Japan on the one hand, and Brazil, Russia, India, and China (thereafter BRICs) on the other. We exclude intra-EU trade flows.
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Our database, BACI, provides reconciled values and unit values (values divided by quantities), at the HS6 level, since 1994. 4 We consider all exchanged products, i.e. the primary and the manufacturing sectors, with the exception of mineral products, notably oil, as well as some specific and non classified sectors. The availability of unit values enables us to classify flows by range of price and thus to analyse the positioning of exporters by price segment. This is of utmost importance since such an approach authorises to tackle the specialisation of countries within products (Schott, 2004 ) on a systematic basis. In Table 1 , we summarise the recent shifts in world market shares as follows. The first three columns give the market share in 1994, 2000, and 2007 . Notice that China has become larger than the U.S. as a super trader. In the three subsequent columns, we observe the percentage point changes in market shares for the whole period and for two sub-periods (1994-2000 and 2000-2007) . In 1994, EU25 had a 19.7% market share in a world market excluding intra-EU trade. This market share has been only slightly affected by competitive pressures from emerging economies, down to 19.3% in 2007. Thus, the EU market share has been fairly affected by the ten-point rise of China over the same period. In contrast, Japan and the U.S. lose around 6 percentage points of market shares each.
The EU's export performance was uneven, varying significantly between markets over the 1994-2007 period. The EU shows a decrease in market shares on some of the most dynamic importing markets during the last decade. 6 The largest gain is in the U.S. market, where the EU accounted for over one fifth of the import market in 2007. This performance coincided with shrinking shares of Japanese exports in the same market (-10.5 p.p. over 1994-2007) and, to a lesser extent, of Canadian (-3.9 p.p.) and ASEAN (-1.6 p.p.) exports. Oppositely, the EU loses market shares on the Japanese and BRICs markets. The apparently small market share loss of EU products on the rapidly expanding Chinese market (-2.8 p.p.) can have a high potential impact in the long run.
EU25 is doing better than EU15, which may be linked to a shift of production lines from incumbent EU countries to New Member States (NMS). The exception is Ireland: Table 2 shows that this country has been the most successful European exporter over the 1994-2007 period, doubling its world market share. Poland, Hungary, Belgium, Austria, and the Czech Republic also recorded large gains in market shares. On the contrary, the U.K., France, and Italy have experienced the greatest losses in their world market shares, followed by Denmark and Sweden.
We now ask whether there has been a recent acceleration of the process of market share redistribution at the world level, and if so, how did the EU manage to cope with it. As a background, we recall the U-shaped evolution of the Euro-U.S. dollar exchange rate throughout the period. In Figure 1 we plot the evolution of world market shares for selected exporters, also summarised in columns 1 to 3 of Table 1 . EU's market shares decreased more during the late 90s than in the early 2000s. Despite the appreciation of the Euro, the early 2000s were a period of partial recovery for the EU25 exports, with most of its previous losses recuperated. This trend is less the case when one considers the EU15 alone, underlining again the positive performances of the ten new member states. Still, much (69%) of the gains recorded by the EU during the second sub-period are due to Germany's excellent performance.
Among other industrialised countries, Japan continued to lose market shares in the second subperiod. All of the U.S. losses are also concentrated in that period. The Chinese competitive pressure has increased since 2000, and not all emerging markets have managed to cope with this. uniform across products, as illustrated in Table 3 . Among the most resilient sectors, the manufacture of wood, vehicles, tobacco, and paper stand out. The largest losses are recorded for the manufacture of non-metallic mineral products, basic metals, furniture, leather, and machinery.
Performances in high-tech and top range products
High-tech and top range quality products play an important role in international competition, since they are basically the output of innovation and the very source of rents. We now concentrate on these two dimensions of trade patterns.
Concerning high-tech products, we simply rely on the classification proposed by Lall (2000) (see Appendix).
Concerning top range products, the procedure deserves more explanation since the method we use aims at tackling the within trade flows heterogeneity. We rely on the distribution of unit values for each HS6 product and year, based on the assumption of a continuum of vertically differentiated products. Notice first that, for a given exporting country, the HS6 data is actually aggregating different flows under a unique heading, reported by several firms on several dates by year. Hence each "flow" reported by the trade statistics will be hardly classified under a unique single vertical specialisation positioning. Accordingly, we rely on a smoother procedure that splits each elementary trade flow into two adjacent ranges of prices out of three (low, medium, high). We start with the relative unit value ratio for any trade flow. Let us note i the exporter, j the destination market, k the product, t the year, and N the number of bilateral flows for product k. The relative unit value of a good k exported by i to j is obtained as the ratio between the bilateral unit value (UV) and the trade weighted geometric average of all unit values in the world: r = r
( 1/N )). If r < 1 then the value allocated to the low range is X t ijk (1 − r α ) and the value in medium range is r α X t ijk . If r > 1 then the value allocated to high range is X t ijk (1 − 1 r α ) and the value allocated to the medium range is X t ijk ( 1 r α ). The lower α, the higher the share of trade in the medium range (here we use α = 4 to end up with similar size groups).
8 Per total, we decompose each bilateral value (X t ijk ) across an additional dimension s, corresponding to the market segment (s = low, mid, up).
Results concerning high-tech products are reported in Table 4 . The first two columns give the world market shares for high-tech products in 2007, and their change in percentage points over the period 1994-2007. The EU is gaining market share in high-tech products: a 0.81 p.p. gain compared to a 0.34 p.p. for all products together (column 4 of Table 1 ). The United States and Japan, on the other hand, recorded losses twice as large as for all products (respectively 11 p.p. and 13 p.p., as shown in the second column of Table 4 ). In the meantime, Chinese gains are very large on the high-tech market (18 p.p.), due to a massive relocation of the assembly of these products to mainland China.
Concerning now the market positioning of exported products, the remaining three pairs of columns in Table 4 give the world market shares in 2007, and their change in percentage points over the period 1994-2007 for each of the three market segments (low, middle, up). The upmarket positioning of EU exports is ascertained. On the whole, the EU has a market share that is almost twice as high for top range products compared to those in the middle or lower range. Japan exhibit a quite similar pattern, while the U.S. have the same market share in upand mid-market products. However, both countries are losing ground in all ranges of products. Differently, the EU managed to increase its market share in top range products, and had a stable or slightly declining share in other products. Chinese gains are concentrated in the middle and the bottom segments of the market, even if Chinese exporters (actually mostly foreign firms assembling in China) have started to gain market shares also in the upper segment of the market.
EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE MARGINS OF WORLD TRADE
Trade can increase either by exchanging a larger value of already traded products between the same partners (the intensive margin of trade), or by increasing the number of involved countries and/or exchanged products (the extensive margin of trade). The former refers to the change in the value of existing trade flows, while the latter refers to the change in the composition of trade flows. Recent theoretical and empirical studies stress that the underlying economic determinants and the outcomes (the gains from trade) of the two margins are quite different. In particular, the same shock (e.g. in terms of trade costs) may affect differently the two trade margins.
Our contribution to the literature is that we use the most detailed trade data compatible with an exhaustive set of exporters, over a decade. 9 Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) , rely on the DOTs (IMF) data, which is total bilateral exports. Also, as compared to them, we use a properly reconciled database instead of proceeding with averages of CIF and FOB records for the same flow. The price to pay for this detail is a shorter time span. Differently from Hummels & Klenow (2005) and Haveman & Hummels (1997) , we rely on a wide sample of countries, since we use the whole matrix of trade flows to compute market shares or unit values. 10 9 Changes in the product classification used limit the time coverage of such exercise. 10 Hummels & Klenow (2005) rely on HS6 data on exports in 1995 by 110 countries to 59 importers. Alternatively, they rely on U.S. imports from 119 countries in over 13,000 10-digit U.S. tariff lines for the same year. Haveman and Hummels rely on 438 positions of 4-digit SITC data for 1990 and for 173 countries.
At the world level
Let us firstly compute the number of potential trade flows. A simple calculation would compare the 2.3 million trade flows observed in 1994 (see Table 5 , Panel 1) with a potential of some 200 countries trading on a bilateral level in some 5,000 products. Accordingly, only a tiny percentage of the whole universe of trade flows would have been observed. However, simply taking the number of products times the number of exporters times the number of importers is misleading: most products are hardly exported by every country. Thus, we must compute this potential number by restricting it to situations where a product is at least exported by a country to one partner. Thus, for each year and product if a country declares its trade with at least one partner, trade flows with all undeclared destinations are considered as true zeros and correspond to potential flows. Under this assumption, we get some 50. Relying on the set of observed flows in Table 5 we compute the intensive and extensive change in the value of world trade between 1994 and 2007. In panel (1) of this Table we start by excluding mineral products, specific, and non-classified products.
11 . The observed USD 5,632 bn 1994-2007 increase in world trade (column C) can be decomposed into three components. Firstly, the 1,647,068 elementary bilateral trade flows existing in 1994 and still in place in 2007 (second line of Table 5 ) have increased their value by USD 4,880 bn. Accordingly, the intensive margin accounted for 86.7% of the change in the value of world trade (ratio of column D to column C). Secondly, 27.6% (626,920) of the number of flows have disappeared during this period. This is the result of firms and countries ceasing trade to certain markets or to certain products. In 1994 these trade flows amounted to USD 149 bn. Lastly, 3,075,360 new countrypartner-product trade flows appeared during the period, corresponding to the positive extensive margin of trade. This is a very large number, outpassing the number of initial trade flows. Overall, only 34.9% of the number of trade flows recorded in 2007 were present in 1994. The remaining 65.1% are new flows (column E) either in terms of destination, exported products, or both. Meanwhile, the contribution of new entries to the 1994-2007 growth of trade in value terms was of only 16.0%. Exits (column F) account for 27.6% of the number of 1994 flows but only for 5.4% of their value. Thus, although the exports of new products and/or to previously unexploited markets (trade relationships that ceased over the period), account for a large share of the total number of flows both in 1994 and 2007, they represent less than one seventh (13.3%) of the increase in global trade in value.
These results must be qualified by performing some sensitivity tests. When we exclude nonindependent territories and microstates 12 , the extensive margin (entries -exits) is 15.6%. An- other important test is to exclude small flows (below USD 10,000) which account for a large share of the total number of individual bilateral trade flows but a very limited share of their value. Besides, these small flows are also excluded in the section 4. 13 When one combines these two corrections, we end up with panel (2) (two last rows of Table 5 ) with a contribution of the extensive margin of 15.2% (853/5,596), pointing to the robustness of our findings.
For large exporters
The contribution of the intensive and the extensive margin of exports for different countries is reported in Table 6 . Using panel (1) of Table 5 , the contribution of the positive extensive margin (entry) to the growth of the value of exports is very similar for the developed economies (around 5%). This points out the pronounced inertia in the orientation of EU, U.S., and Japanese exports. Their trade growth is mainly accounted for by expansion in existing markets (96.9%, 97.5%, and respectively 101.9%), while the negative extensive margin (exit) is largest in Japan (6.8%) and lowest in the EU (1.4%). Unsurprisingly, emerging economies are characterised by a larger contribution of the positive extensive margin. It peaks at 69.1% for Ukraine, with high levels of 54.3% for Russia, 30.2% for Brazil, 28.8% for India, and 25.5% for Turkey.
14 The exceptions to this trend among developing countries are Mexico and China, which experienced a structure of exports growth similar to the triad. Mexico reaped the benefits of its preferential market to the huge U.S. market, but did not manage to diversify its portfolio of products or markets over the considered period. As for China, the results confirm the importance of the increased intensive margin, whereas the diversification of exports was already accomplished in 1994 (e.g., China is shipping roughly as many different products as Germany is shipping to the U.S.). Switching to panel (2) of Table 5 , there are no pronounced changes.
trade. We keep however Taiwan and Macau due to the large value of their trade. 13 In this case the extensive margin (entries -exits) is 13.0%. 14 Detailed results at the country level are reported only for our selection of large exporters in Table 6 and for all member states in Table . 3 in Appendix. How did the different EU member states behave in terms of the two margins of trade? Did new member states have a better performance in the extensive margins of trade than former member states? Old members states increased their exports mainly along the already established trade relationships. The relative importance of the intensive margin goes from 47.2% for Greece to 93.3% for Germany. On the opposite, new members exports' growth is acquired mainly by developing new trade relationships. 15 . All new member states have a contribution of the positive extensive margin to the growth of their exports near or larger than 50%. It ranges from 48.2% for Hungary to 90.1% for Estonia. Among the fifteen old member states only Greece and Belgium exhibit such large figures. Since export baskets and destinations of the new EU members have been profoundly reshaped during the 1994-2007 period, the negative extensive margin is also large. Still, the contribution of the net extensive margin to the growth of exports remains large and positive for these countries: 87.7% for Estonia, 66.3% for Slovakia, 60.0% for Poland, etc. This is to be compared with 6.0% for Germany, for instance (Table .3 
in Appendix).
We now decompose the intensive margin of exports using an econometric shift-share methodology. Our objective is to rely on this decomposition to identify the changes the determinants of the good resilience of EU market shares in the upper segment of the market.
AN ECONOMETRIC SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS OF EXPORTS GROWTH
This section aims at identifying the contributions to the intensive margin of exports: what are the product and market composition effects and what resorts to pure competitiveness? One of the simplest ways to investigate growth rates is the shift-share technique, also known as constant market share analysis or structural decomposition. The shift-share decomposition identity was first proposed by Maddison (1952) and was extensively used afterwards. Although employed mainly in regional studies on economic and employment growth, this method has been successfully extended to trade issues. We will adopt an econometric approach, taking benefit of the detailed data available, instead of a traditional decomposition. As in Panel 2 of Table 5 , we exclude flows below USD 10,000, as well as mineral, specific and non classified products.
Before proceeding, it is worth underlining that the definition of the intensive margin adopted here is more inclusive than the one used in the former Section. Indeed, an analysis of the redistribution in world market shares restricted to flows present in 1994 would be questionable. Hence, we define the intensive margin as the increase in the value of flows existing in any two consecutive years from 1994 to 2007, which is a first difference with previous Section. Secondly, in order to capture more flows in the intensive margin, we now aggregate the data to the 2-digits level of the HS. Still, market positioning is observed at the HS6 level as previously. The intensive margin of our shift-share sample is bn USD 5,564 instead of 4,743 in panel (2) of Table 5 .
The shift-share methodology applied to the growth of exports
In the field of international trade, the traditional shift-share analysis aims to measure the contribution of countries' geographical and sectoral specialisation to the growth of their exports. Since shift-share analysis is performed on yearly exports growth, only the intensive margin of trade is explained.
The method simply aims at computing the contribution of the initial geographical and sectoral composition of exports to changes in market shares. The remaining part of the change is pure performance (i.e. competitiveness). This method has been extensively used in competitiveness studies. Laursen (1999) , Wörz (2003) or Alcántara Escolano & Blanes Cristóbal (2000) are example of papers using the structural decomposition to analyse trade performances at the country level.
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The traditional shift-share analysis is based on an algebraic decomposition of the total exports growth of a country during a given time period. Four contributions are identified, namely world trade growth, growth in exports of individual products (sectoral effect), growth in imports of specific markets (geographical effect), and a residual performance of the exporter.
17
Such structural decomposition has a major drawback: results are sensitive to the order in which the composition effects are considered. Computing sectoral effects first and geographical effects afterwards and vice versa yields different results. Departing from this traditional analysis, we rely here on a shift-share methodology based on econometrics, proposed by Cheptea et al. (2005) , which is a further development of Jayet (1993) weighted variance analysis of growth rates. 18 The aim of this method is ultimately to decompose the growth of each country's exports into three terms: a geographic structure effect, a sectoral effect, and an exporter-effect which represents also the exporter's performance. The bilateral and sectoral exports growth rates are regressed on dummies identifying exporters (i), importers (j) and HS2 groups of products (k). More than half of the fixed effects exhibit an absolute value of the t-test larger to 2 (the distributions are plotted in Figures .1 to . 3 in Appendix).
However, differently from Cheptea et al. (2005) , the growth rate of country i's exports is computed here as the change in the logarithm of the Tornqvist index of its exports:
( 1) where X stands for the value of exports, w ijk = 0.5
, and w Tornqvist index is a geometric mean index, with weights taking into account the value of trade in years t and t−1, accounting in this way for structural changes. Diewert (1976) shows that the Tornqvist price index measures the change in a cost or expenditure function that has the translog functional form, and that the Tornqvist quantity index measures the change in a translog utility or production function (in these cases the Tornqvist index is an "ideal" index).
Therefore, to compute country-level structural and performance effects, we explain the growth rate of each individual trade flow (from each exporter to each importer for a given product and a year) by weighted OLS with exporter (i), importer (j), and product (k) fixed effects:
17 The following equation gives this identity:
where i denotes the exporter, j the importer, k the product or sector, t the time period, r the global growth rate of exports for all countries in the sample except i, r k the global growth rate of product k exports, and r jk the global growth rate of exports of product k to country j. There are three components when market shares are used. 18 The traditional shift-share analysis is actually a constrained and imperfect version of regression and variance analysis techniques. 19 See ?.
The decomposition of exports growth is done separately for each year from 1994 to 2007. Results for the entire period are obtained by summing up the different effects across years.
Exporting countries have no influence on structural effects affecting their exports. These effects result from the growth in destination markets, given the geographical and sectoral composition of exports. In contrast, the performance effect is a true competitiveness effect. It indicates the degree to which the exporting country was able to gain or lose market shares, after controlling for composition effects.
Concerning the decomposition of changes in world market shares by market segment, an additional issue has to be addressed. In order to fully capture year on year changes in market shares for a given exporter, one must take into account the fact that some flows may be classified in two different market segments in two subsequent years. These shifters are not present when the computation of the growth rates is performed on flows classified at both dates in the same market segment. To bypass this problem, we adopted the following strategy: for each triple (exporter, importer, HS6) and year we classify:
• As middle range products, flows present in the top range in t 1 but not in t 0 ;
• As middle range products, flows present in the top range in t 0 but not in t 1 ;
• Other shifters as bottom range products.
Non-shifters (e.g. top range in t 0 and t 1 ) are kept in their initial range indeed.
Contributions to the changes in world market shares: all products
We now report the results of the decomposition based on the shift-share analysis. The sample used eliminates the noise associated with tiny values (below USD 10,000), non-independent territories and microstates, and drops HS sections 25, 26, 27, 97, 98, 99. The estimation is performed at the 2-digit level of the HS (the 6-digit level does not give very different results, while the HS2 secures higher statistical significance of parameter estimates). We explain the annual growth of all trade flows existing in any two consecutive years in the period 1994-2007. The statistical significance of fixed effects α
The first three columns in Table 7 report the market shares in 1994 and 2007, and respectively the difference between the two for countries in our sample. These figures have been already discussed in section 2: e.g. the EU25 is losing 0.34 p.p. of the world market shares (the same figures were presented in Table 1 ). The next two columns consider the change in the world market shares by focusing on the intensive margins of trade only. The difference with the first three columns must be cautiously understood before reading the results presented below.
Column (4) The change in market shares for products taken as a whole over the entire period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) is provided in the first part of Table 8 . The -0.9% loss of world market share by the EU25 in the first column is the same figure as that in the last column of Table 7 . This loss is exclusively attributable to the negative performance effect of European exporters, since the geographic and sectoral structure of EU exports both contributed positively to the growth of European exports. Focusing on EU15 only reinforces this conclusion: the difference with new Member states is striking. Market share in USD terms Market shares when trade growth can be calculated Country 1994 Country , 2007 Country , 1994 Country -2007 Country 1994 Country -2007 Country 1994 Country -2007 More generally, the individual performances of member states are very different: the Irish performance, as well as the performance of most new member states, is striking and contrasts with the difficulty faced by the U.K., France, Denmark, Belgium-Luxembourg, and Sweden. Of the EU15, only Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain suffer from a poor sectoral specialisation (Table  .4 in Appendix).
However, the magnitude of EU losses is much more limited than those recorded by Japan and the USA. All in all, the EU performance remains satisfactory given the pressure of new competitors such as China and India. This resilience of EU market shares is particularly marked in the most recent period. In the second part of Table 8 we can see that this is largely due to the competitiveness of new member states: the EU15 market share in third markets is virtually unchanged, while the NMS10 almost doubled their market shares since 2001.
A focus on high-tech and top range products
We now consider the changes in world market shares for high-tech products and top range products. As already stressed, the two dimensions are considered here separately. High-tech products are defined at the most detailed level of the product classification, regardless of their market positioning in terms of unit values. Results are reported in the upper part of Table  9 . Besides, as in the previous sections, we ranked individual countries exports in three price segments of the world market, considering all products, whatever their technological level, and relying on unit values of trade flows. We report in the lower part of Table 9 the results only for up-market products, i.e. the highest segment of unit values. The decomposition is still performed at the HS2 level.
Regarding high-tech products first, we observe a 6.7% increase in EU's world market share. This figure is the result of a favourable sectoral positioning of European exporters, dampened by their disappointing performance on dynamic foreign markets. The performance of the EU25 on high-tech products is considerably better than that of the U.S. and Japan, who lose within the decade over half of their 1994 market shares, due to a massive relocation of their assembly lines in Asia, in particular in China. For the U.S. this is partly due to an even more pronounced specialisation in products with highly growing import demand. Market share losses of developed countries are compensated by large gains recorded by many developing countries. India and China stand out with the best performances, by doubling, respectively tripling, their initial market shares. We now shift to the second part of Table 9 , focusing on the upper segment of the world market. The changes in EU market shares on this segment are considerably different from those in all products (Table 8) , pointing to an upgrading of the unit values of exported goods. This is not due to a gain in market share on individual markets, since the contribution of the "performance" is negative even for up-market products in the EU case (still much less than for Japan and the U.S.). The only positive contribution is sectoral, meaning that the EU has benefitted from a composition effect, whereby world demand has increased faster for its most exported upmarket products. Here again the difference with the new Member states is striking, even if these percentage changes apply to tiny market shares. Contrasting with the EU, Japan and the U.S. have benefitted from a favourable geographical orientation of their exports of up-market products, thanks to a larger orientation toward a fast growing Asian market.
CONCLUSION
In a context of profound reshaping of world trade flows since the mid-1990s, we observe that the redistribution of market shares observed between emerging and developed countries -and among developing countries themselves -has differently affected the EU, Japan and the U.S. EU managed to maintain its world market share at 19.3% for goods (excluding energy) losing only 0.34 percentage points over the period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Market share losses are considerably more important in the case of the United States and Japan with 6 and 6.2 percentage points decline respectively. The U.S. and Japan now account for 12.5%, and respectively 8.6% of world market shares.
Our analysis of the intensive and extensive change in the value of world trade shows that although the exports of new products and/or to previously unexploited markets account for a large share of the total number of flows both in 1994 and 2007, they represent less than 15% of the increase in global trade in value. The contribution of the intensive margin to the growth of the value of exports of all developed countries is large, pointing to a relative inertia in the orientation of European, American and Japanese exports.
Our shift-share analysis of exports growth shows that European losses recorded between 1994 and 2007 are exclusively attributable to a negative contribution of the performance for European exporters. On the contrary, the geographic and sectoral structure of EU exports contributed positively to the exports growth. Focusing on EU15 reinforces this conclusion.
Regarding high-tech products, the EU slightly increases its world market share (0.8 p.p.). Such better positioning of the EU25 among developed countries is due not only to a superior export performance, but also to a more pronounced specialisation in products with highly growing import demand.
This paper has two contributions. From a methodological point of view, our findings illustrate the advantage of working at the most detailed level of the classification of products when it comes to defining market segments. These results also illustrate the pros of a shift share analysis applied to the intensive margin of country exports. From a policy perspective, our results indicate that the EU has better resisted the competition of emerging big traders, thanks to a buoyant world demand for top range products its exporters were specialised in.
is also a small "non classified" range of trade flows for which data on trade quantities is not available and unit values can not be computed. But they represent less than 10% of the world trade. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: BACI, authors' calculations.
